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2SUMMARY
Structural similarities and differences between
a country and the economic integration
framework to which it belongs show the de-
gree to which the country may be exposed to
asymmetric shocks. Synchronization of busi-
ness cycles implies that asymmetric shock is
precluded, or offset by national monetary
policies. After joining a monetary union the
situation changes. Where synchronization of
business cycles is lacking, a common mone-
tary policy will tend to exacerbate differences
in the cycles and adversely affect economic
performance.
In the case of the EU and EMU, want of
synchronization between the business cycles
of a candidate country and the EU can be off-
set partly by labour-market flexibility. Joining
the EU may mean foregoing some flexibility in
the labour market, because the EU labour
markets have become rigid and need reforms
and greater flexibility themselves.
Methodologically, the time series of GDP
and industrial-production growth rates can be
used to measure this synchronization. In the
case of Hungary, the EU–Hungarian business-
cycle convergence had been no less than the
convergence among EU countries. Although
the results of the analyses using different
methods vary but all of them show that this
synchronization has been increasing since the
mid-1990s.
Synchronization of national business cy-
cles and national catching-up processes dis-
guise regional differences in synchronization
and convergence of development levels. Sev-
eral recent analyses and studies have shown a
combination of convergence of economic de-
velopment levels among countries and in-
creasing divergence among regions within
countries to be a feature of the present global
economic situation. The presence or absence
of such a feature in Hungary will have far-
reaching consequences to its integration into
the EU.
Some major questions arise about other
economic-policy options instead of adjusting
exchange and interest rates, which EMU pre-
cludes. It can be seen that wages have to bear
the brunt of adjustment under EMU and need
to react flexibly to shocks, lest differences in
national unemployment rates develop. Wages
therefore have to be highly flexible and differ-
entiated in the various economic zones of
EMU. An important governmental task in EU
countries is to make the national labour mar-
kets more flexible, which could be done
through institutional reforms aimed at re-
ducing unemployment.
Although Hungary’s economy has visibly
converged on those of the EU countries, po-
tential adverse effects of EU accession and
EMU could bring about serious economic dif-
ficulties. Participation of Hungary in EMU
calls for an economy able to adjust either
through market forces or adequate economic
policy.
The structural differences of labour-
market supply and demand are likely to re-
main on the Hungarian labour market for
quite a long time. Labour markets usually re-
act to negative demand shocks by reducing
the participation rate and increasing the share
of the inactive population. Due to the struc-
tural problems in the Hungarian labour force,
much of the inactive population cannot be
considered as potential labour in periods of
economic prosperity or in the medium term.
All these features will have effects on the tools
of adjustment policy to cope with shocks after
Hungary’s accession to the EU and EMU.
5INTRODUCTION
Hungary, like all Central and Eastern European
(CEE) countries has undergone radical eco-
nomic changes in the transition process of the
last 13 years, affecting its economic structure
and reallocating its labour force. The forth-
coming accession to the EU and subsequent
participation in the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) herald further deep-seated
changes. As the country prepares, the issues
raised include catching up with EU levels of
development, greater structural similarities,
and synchronization of business cycles.
Structural similarities and differences
between a country and the economic integra-
tion framework to which it belongs show the
degree to which the country may be exposed to
asymmetric shocks. Synchronization of busi-
ness cycles implies that asymmetric shock is
precluded, or offset by national monetary poli-
cies. The situation in this respect may be an
indication as to whether the optimum cur-
rency-area theory applies to that economy.
Where synchronization of business cycles is
lacking, a common monetary policy will tend
to exacerbate differences in the cycles and ad-
versely affect economic performance.
In the case of the EU and EMU, want of
synchronization between the business cycles of
a candidate country and the EU can be offset
partly by labour-market flexibility. Joining the
EU may mean foregoing some flexibility in the
labour market, because the EU labour markets
have become rigid and need reforms and
greater flexibility themselves.
This paper discusses some important is-
sues of adjustment mechanisms under the
conditions of EMU. Part 1 presents some chal-
lenges of EU membership and EMU participa-
tion. Part 2 analyses the relations between the
business cycles and Part 3 shows regional dis-
parities within Hungary. Part 4 describes what
EU and EMU membership entails, and Part 5
the salient features of the Hungarian labour
market. Part 6 shows the likely consequences.
1) CHALLENGES BY EU MEMBERSHIP
AND EMU PARTICIPATION
Accession to the EU will have positive and
negative effects on the economies and societies
of the CEE countries. The benefits will out-
weigh the costs, especially in the long run, but
pressure on certain economic, social and po-
litical groups will intensify. These can be iden-
tified in terms of geographical locations or re-
gions, social strata and occupational groups.
The optimum accession policy would aim at
maximizing the benefits and minimizing the
adverse consequences, so that accession will
certainly bring further policy adjustments.
Identification of the potential beneficiar-
ies of accession and the groups at risk is a key
integration issue for policy makers and the
general public. This is the initial stage in for-
mulating the measures for alleviating the costs
for losers and increasing the number of win-
ners.
One urgent need is for a strategy to dis-
seminate information about the expected ad-
vantages and drawbacks of accession. EU ac-
cession will raise several new economic social
and political issues or exacerbate existing eco-
nomic, political and social issues and prob-
lems. The economic aspects of these will be
determined by the completion of free move-
ment of production factors (goods, services,
capital and labour). Special areas of these are
agriculture and EMU. The social problems will
include a deepening crisis for vulnerable social
groups determined by age structure, educa-
tional background, already existing poverty
and inequality, and occupational and pay
structures. The accession will affect a wide
range of political mechanisms and elements.
The success of the accession and the optimiza-
tion of winners’ and losers’ positions will de-
pend much on the preparedness of the public
administration, the activity and efficiency of
6non-governmental organizations, the quality
of pubic education, and not at least, the in-
volvement of the public in the accession proc-
ess.
Participation in EMU has more complex
consequences. In a monetary union, exchange
and interest rates can no longer be used as
adjustment measures for differences of eco-
nomic development between member coun-
tries. Such differences may emerge due to
asymmetric shocks affecting the members or
through diverging business cycles. A shock
will cause production and employment to fall
rapidly. Before EMU, countries were able to
devalue their currencies and so regain eco-
nomic competitiveness. Now the range of pos-
sible policy measures has been reduced.
2) RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
HUNGARIAN AND EU BUSINESS CYCLES
Hungary developed strong depend-
ence on the EU economy in the
1990s, as the transition to a market
economy transferred its economic
ties there from the former Come-
con countries. The reorientation
in its economic relations has
rested on increasing merchandise
trading with EU countries and
mounting flows of inward FDI
from Western European compa-
nies.
The structure of the Hun-
garian economy has become very similar to
that of the twelve EMU countries. This can be
shown in the sector distribution of value added
and of employment (Table 2)
It is important to know whether Hun-
gary’s business cycle has converged with that
of the EU over the last decade. Methodologi-
cally, the time series of GDP and industrial-
production growth rates can be used to meas-
ure this synchronization, on which several
studies have been published in recent years.1
Although their methods of analysis differed,
the general conclusion in most cases was that
the EU–Hungarian business-cycle convergence
had been no less than the convergence among
EU countries. This synchronization has been
increasing since the mid-1990s.
Table 1
Hungary’s foreign trade with the world
and with the EU
Exports
(USD mn)
Imports
 (USD mn)
World EU
EU
(%)
World EU
EU
(%)
1991 10187 4659 45.7 11382 4682 41.1
1992 10705 5327 49.8 11079 4734 42.7
1993 8907 4140 46.5 12530 5024 40.1
1994 10701 5457 51.0 14554 6600 45.3
1995 12867 8080 62.8 15466 9515 61.5
1996 13145 8250 62.8 16209 9685 59.8
1996* 15704 10949 69.7 18144 11301 62.3
1997* 19100 13602 71.2 21234 13326 62.8
1998* 23005 16782 72.9 25706 16479 64.1
1999* 25013 19068 76.2 28002 18049 64.5
2000* 28092 21117 75.2 32079 18761 58.5
2001* 30498 22651 74.3 33682 19464 57.8
* Including foreign trade in industrial free-trade zones.
Source: Central Statistical Office (CSO), Budapest.
EU Commission analyses have shown
that Hungary’s GDP growth rate has achieved
a fairly high correlation of 0.79 with that of
the EU 15 (Table 3). Indeed, it had the strong-
est coefficient found among the 13 applicant
countries, where the others showed lower,
very low or even negative correlations. Com-
paring the trends of pure GDP growth rates
suggests that the cyclical movements of the
                                                
1 E.g. Frenkel, Nickel and Schmidt (1999), Boone and
Maurel (1999), IMF (2000), EU Commission (2001),
and Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001).
Table 2
Sector structure of value added and employment in Hungary and
the EMU countries, 2000, %
Value added Employment
Sector
EMU 12* Hungary EMU 12* Hungary
Agriculture, forestry 2.9 4.4 5.3 5.9
Industry (incl. energy) 23.2 28.0 20.4 28.1
Construction 5.5 4.8 7.3 6.4
Wholesale, retail, transport,
hotels, restaurants 21.3 22.3 25.0 24.5
Finance, real estate 26.1 20.9 13.0 7.2
Other services 21.0 19.2 29.1 27.9
* Weighted average.
Sources: OECD, Eurostat and CSO.
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were usually being influenced by the same
economic factors over the last decade.
Table 3
Correlation between the GDP growth rates of Hun-
gary and of the EU
Average GDP (monthly values, annual
growth rates), 1994–2000 3.5
Correlation coefficient with EU 15,
January 1996–February 2001 0.79
Source: EU Commission (2001).
The synchronized movements of GDP
growth rates in Hungary and the EU during
the first half of the 1990s were not brought
about by symmetrical economic shocks. The
slowdown in Hungary’s economic growth rate
was caused partly by the systemic change and
partly by the economic recession in the EU,
which was resulted by German reunification.
Much has changed since then, so that true
similarities could be observed in their business
cycles in the second half of the 1990s. Both
were affected by the Russian crises and the
subsequent slowdown in economic growth
rates, and finally by the global slowdown in
economic performance.
The same conclusion can be drawn from
a comparison of the seasonally adjusted real
GDP figures (Figure 1).
Figure 1
Seasonally adjusted real GDP growth rates
(quarterly data)
Source: Csajbók and Csermely (2002).
A more precise presentation of the syn-
chronization of business cycles could be
achieved by separating the trends for GDP
growth (potential GDP) and for output gap,
but shortcomings in the statistical data prevent
this being done in Hungary’s case.
Industrial-production trends can also
provide useful information. Looking at Hun-
gary’s quarterly data, the long-term time series
reveals an increasing correlation with the EU
industrial cycle. The result of the calculation of
this made by the EU Commission is comparable
with the correlation result for GDP growth
rates. The correlation has increased over the
last decade. At the same time, the amplitude of
the Hungarian industrial-production cycle has
increased beyond the value for the EU. This
implies a firm positive correspondence be-
tween the EU economy and the Hungarian
economy, so that further catching up by Hun-
gary would be more easily attained in the pres-
ence of strong GDP growth rate in the EU
countries.
Table 4
Correlation of Hungary’s industrial-production
growth rates with those of the EU
1994–7
1997–
June
2001
Change
Average industrial pro-
duction (monthly values,
annual growth rates) 7.2 13.0 5.8
Correlation coefficient
with EU-15 0.577 0.66 0.09
Standard deviation (multi-
ple of EU standard devia-
tion) 2.5 3.2 0.7
 Source: EU Commission (2001).
The Hungarian National Bank, in its cal-
culations, replaced the trend in GDP growth
(potential GDP) and output gap with analysis
of industrial-production data, and determined
the business cycles with the Baxter-King filter2
and logarithms of real quarterly data.3 Al-
though industrial production is only part of
total output, it makes a good indicator of the
business cycle. International experience has
shown that between GDP and industrial pro-
duction there is a strong correlation. Moreo-
                                                
2 The two parameters of the filter were 6 and 32, which
eliminated cycles shorter than one-and-a-half and
longer than eight years.
3 Csajbók and Csermely (2002).
8ver, there are more frequent and reliable in-
dustrial production time series than GDP data.
Hungary and the EU showed opposite
trends in their business cycles in the early
1990s, as German unification was still having
positive effects on industrial demand in the EU,
while Hungary was dominated by the effects of
the transformation recession. Later, the EMS
crisis of 1993 triggered an economic recession
in the EU countries, but this affected the al-
ready-recovering level of Hungarian industrial
production only slightly.
The connection between the industrial
production cycles of the EU and Hungary had
changed substantially by the mid-1990s. The
previously dominant contrasting trends were
gradually replaced by synchronized cycles.
This change was mainly brought about by the
shift in the structure of foreign trade. After the
collapse of Hungary’s Comecon-related trade,
the share of the EU rapidly increased to 50–70
per cent of exports and imports. In parallel
with this, the correlation coefficient between
the industrial-production cycles of the EU and
Hungary gradually increased from 0.22 per
cent in 1992 to 0.66 in 2000. During the
whole decade, Hungarian business cycles
showed greater volatility than those of the EU,
due to the higher growth rates of the transition
period.
Figure 2
Cyclical component of industrial production in the
EU 15 and Hungary
Source: Based on Csajbók and Csermely (2002).
Business-cycle development can also be
analysed in a way that distinguishes supply-
side and demand-side effects, for instance with
structural vector auto-regressive (VAR) mod-
els. This method has two advantages. (i) The
supply-side shocks can be considered autono-
mous factors and always affect an economy in
the same way, irrespective of whether it be-
longs to a monetary union or not. The reason
for this is that the effects of a monetary policy
always appear on the demand side, where the
symmetry of shocks is usually influenced by
differences of reaction to the single monetary
policy by members of the monetary union. So
the demand-side shocks and the symmetry
have less relevance under monetary-union
conditions to evaluating their possible symme-
try.  (ii) The separation of supply and demand-
side shocks explicitly distinguishes long-term
(supply-side) and short-term (demand-side)
effects. The supply shocks can be considered
long lasting because many result from devel-
opment or changes in production technologies.
This is important because modern under-
standing of monetary policy defines the pri-
mary task differently: monetary policy should
smooth temporary fluctuations, not influence
main trends. So it can achieve price stability
and contribute to a permanent increase of out-
put by offsetting demand shocks. That means
the optimality of a currency zone depends on
the similarity of demand shocks.
The two arguments come to different,
perhaps contradictory conclusions and their
relevance may differ from various vantage
points. In Hungary’s case, the second argu-
ment has more relevance, because of the radi-
cal structural changes of the 1990s gave a se-
ries of country-specific supply shocks, deter-
mined basically by imports of technology. So
there were fewer or more limited synchronized
movements among the supply effects in the EU
and Hungary. However, the catching-up proc-
ess in Hungary will reduce such supply-side
asymmetries and increase the correlation of
supply-side cycles in the near future.
In Hungary’s case, a generally used cal-
culation and analytical method was applied.4
The separation of supply and demand rests on
the simple assumption that demand-led price-
level increases result in a temporary increase
in output and supply-led price-level increases
in a lasting decrease in output. First, demand
and supply shocks were calculated for each EU
country from quarterly data. Then three types
                                                
4 Based on Blachard and Quah (1989) and developed by
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993).
9of characteristic weighted averages were cal-
culated so that the variance of the time series
was determined by (a) the first main compo-
nent (coefficient) (b) inflation, or (c) the
shares of EU countries in total Hungarian ex-
ports.
The result of the calculation based on (a)
was that the demand-side correlation showed a
level of symmetry corresponding to that of
most present EU members. The supply-side
correlation showed a weaker level, however.
This implies that the possibility of exchange-
rate adjustment may still be a useful policy
weapon for adjusting the Hungarian economy.
The situation may improve after EU accession,
as the features of the catching-up process al-
ready mentioned will increase the symmetry of
future supply-side shocks.
The calculation using inflation (b) as
weights showed that the supply and demand
correlation between Hungary and the EU in-
creased. The correlation coefficient for the pe-
riod from the first quarter of 1992 to the
fourth quarter of 2000 was about 0.23 and for
the period from the first quarter of 1996 to the
fourth quarter of 2000 it was 0.7.
Figure 3
Average demand shocks in Hungary and the EU
(quarterly data)
Source: Based on Csajbók and Csermely (2002).
Figure 4
Average supply shocks in Hungary and the EU
(quarterly data)
Source: Based on Csajbók and Csermely (2002).
The demand for Hungarian exports in-
fluenced significantly the development of the
business cycle and external balances, which
means that shares of EU countries in total
Hungarian exports (c) can be reasonable
weights for constructing a specific, weighted
average time series of demand and supply
shocks. The symmetry between the supply and
demand fluctuations of the Hungarian econ-
omy and its main trading partners can be
measured under the condition of disability to
adjust by using own exchange-rate policy.
With the time series calculated with ex-
port shares (c) as weights, there is a weaker
correlation between the supply and demand
shocks, mainly because the symmetry between
the Hungarian business cycle and that of its
two main trading partners, Germany and Aus-
tria, was rather limited for the whole of the last
decade. However, the supply and demand
correlation between the Hungarian and Ger-
man data increased slightly.
Table 5
Supply and demand correlation between Hungary
and the EU
(1Q/1992–4Q/2000)
Country Demand Supply Share in Hungary’sexports (%)
Germany
Austria
Italy
France
Netherlands
Belgium
Finland
Spain
0.12
0.10
0.36
0.39
0.15
0.03
0.23
0.17
-0.08
-0.07
0.23
0.19
0.17
0.33
0.05
0.17
52.1
11.3
9.1
8.6
6.6
4.8
2.9
4.8
EU* 0.22 0.04
* Weighted average.
Source: Csajbók and Csermely (2002).
Besides the National Bank of Hungary,
similar SVAR-model analyses were made by
Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001) and Frenkel,
Nickel and Schmidt (1999). A thorough com-
parison of their results could provide a more
accurate description, as there are significant
differences between them. However, they
agree in saying that there is increasing sym-
metry and a strengthening correlation between
the business cycles of Hungary and the EU.
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3) REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN HUNGARY
AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
THEM
Synchronization of national business cycles
and national catching-up processes may dis-
guise regional differences in synchronization
and convergence of development levels. Sev-
eral recent analyses and studies have shown a
combination of convergence of economic de-
velopment levels among countries and in-
creasing divergence among regions within
countries to be a feature of the present global
economic situation. The presence or absence of
such a feature
in Hungary
will have far-
reaching con-
sequences to
its integration
into the EU.
The in-
come level of
Hungary, in
terms of pur-
chasing-power
parity (PPS), is
about 51 per
cent of the EU
average. There
has been a
moderate but
gradually
strengthening
process of
catching up in
the last dec-
ade, with a
relatively
strong gain of
about 6 per-
centage points
between 1995
and 2001.
However, in-
come differ-
ences within the country widened the same
period, as the data for income development at
regional levels (NUTS3 or NUTS2) confirm.
Higher income regions (Central and the three
Transdanubian regions) posted higher-than-
average gains, so that regional income differ-
entials increased. Participation rates and un-
employment rates in the rich regions diverged
one from the rest as well as from the national
average.
This divergence per se contradicts the
Neoclassical view of economic integration. In
theory, higher marginal rates of factor pro-
ductivity should have pushed up the degree of
real convergence in the low-income regions,
and should have reduced the difference be-
tween these regions and the high-income ones.
However, it should be borne in mind that this
Table 6
Economic activity by regions in Hungary, in 2001
GDP/capita as a proportion of the national average (%)
Region
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Central Hungary 142 147 149 148 154 155
Central Transdanubia 92 92 96 98 94 101
Western Transdanubia 103 105 105 110 115 114
Southern Transdanubia 85 80 78 77 77 74
Northern Hungary 74 69 67 68 66 64
Northern Great Plain 72 70 69 68 64 63
Southern Great Plain 83 81 78 76 74 71
Total Hungary
Participation rate (%)
Region
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Central Hungary 61.1 58.3 56.3 54.9 54.9 54.1 54.3 56.2 57.1 56.9
Central Transdanubia 59.8 57.4 55.1 53.6 52.8 52.2 53.7 55.7 55.7 55.9
Western Transdanubia 60.1 59.2 57.6 55.5 56.3 56.2 57.8 58.1 58.5 58.5
Southern Transdanubia 57.2 54.4 53.1 49.1 49.1 48.9 50.1 50.7 51.3 50.5
Northern Hungary 54.7 52.6 49.9 48.8 47.7 46.8 46.4 48.1 48.5 47.8
Northern Great Plain 54.6 51.4 49.5 48.1 46.9 45.7 46.3 48.3 48.1 48.3
Southern Great Plain 58.2 54.4 52.3 51.4 50.6 50.9 51.1 51.5 51.8 52.4
Total Hungary 58.3 55.7 53.7 52.1 51.6 51.1 51.6 53.1 53.4 53.3
Unemployment rate (%)
Region
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Central Hungary 7.4 9.9 8.8 7.4 8.2 7.1 5.7 5.2 5.3 4.3
Central Transdanubia 11.7 12.6 10.7 11.1 10.4 8.1 6.8 6.1 4.9 4.3
Western Transdanubia 7.3 9.1 7.7 6.9 7.1 6.1 6.1 4.4 4.2 4.2
Southern Transdanubia 9.6 12.8 12.1 12.1 9.4 9.9 9.4 8.3 7.8 7.8
Northern Hungary 14.1 16.1 15.2 16.1 15.5 14.1 12.2 11.6 10.1 8.5
Northern Great Plain 12.5 14.8 13.8 13.8 13.2 12.1 11.1 10.2 9.3 7.8
Southern Great Plain 10.2 12.4 10.5 9.3 8.4 7.3 7.1 5.8 5.1 5.4
Total Hungary 9.9 12.1 10.8 10.3 10.1 8.8 7.8 7.1 6.4 5.7
Source: CSO.
11
is a long-term, equilibrium view that does not
take into account the specificity of transforma-
tion and temporary, transformation-related
costs in terms of lower incomes. These argu-
ments support the view that a catching-up
process in a region will initially increase ine-
quality within a country, but the inequality
will start to diminish later.
4) SOME LABOUR-MARKET EFFECTS OF
EU MEMBERSHIP AND EMU
PARTICIPATION
From the point of view of the effects of eco-
nomic shocks, the homogeneity and heteroge-
neity of the economic structures of EMU mem-
ber countries are important. Homogeneity of
structures means that shocks in these countries
are correlated and their economies interde-
pendent. Several analyses have shown the
positive effects of participating in the EU inte-
gration. First, it has had a positive and asym-
metric effects on long-term economic growth –
relatively higher rates for poorer member
countries (e.g. Crespo-Cuaresma et al. 2002).
Secondly, it has increased the correlation of
output, stock-market indices and prices within
EMU (e.g. Angeloni and Dedola 1999). How-
ever, heterogeneity has remained in some
countries, such as the UK. It is important to
know whether a monetary union will bring
about a greater specialization in space (Krug-
man 1993) or make the economic structure
more homogenous.
Some major questions arise about other
economic-policy options instead of adjusting
exchange and interest rates, which EMU pre-
cludes. The first option is to replace currency
devaluation with labour migration, but al-
though the four freedoms prevail in the EU
single market, labour migration from de-
pressed to prospering countries remains lim-
ited by language and cultural diversity. It is not
likely to play more than a modest role as an
adjustment mechanism. Capital mobility does
not make a good substitute for labour migra-
tion, because it accentuates development di-
vergence and increases competition among
locations. This leaves the option of relative
price changes. Competitiveness can be im-
proved by real depreciation (falling relative
prices of non-tradables) and stimulating pro-
duction of tradables.
This means that wages bear the brunt of
adjustment under EMU and need to react
flexibly to shocks, lest differences in national
unemployment rates develop. The shock-
absorbing role should then be taken over by
financial transfers, but the current system of
EU financial transfers cannot cope with this or
the financial needs of adjustment. Wages
therefore have to be highly flexible and differ-
entiated in the various economic zones of
EMU. An important governmental task in EU
countries is to make the national labour mar-
kets more flexible, which could be done
through institutional reforms aimed at reduc-
ing unemployment. Few EU countries have yet
managed to introduce the kind of genuine re-
forms required by a monetary union.
Policy-making comes under constant
pressure from economic lobbies and interest
groups. Institutional changes on the labour
market generate political debate and opposi-
tion from certain economic and political inter-
ests, while others seek to shape the system of
the labour markets and wage bargaining on a
national or even EU level. The alternatives be-
fore labour-market reform – national or joint
wage and employment policies – would create
significantly different conditions for the future
functioning of EMU.
A joint European wage policy runs
counter to the economic rationale of a mone-
tary union, which calls for decentralization of
wage formation, so that regional competitive-
ness can be restored and unemployment re-
duced whenever asymmetric shocks occur.
With a joint wage policy, political pressure on
monetary policy will inevitably increase when-
ever the jobless rate exceeds a level perceived
as politically tolerable. Solving unemployment
is not and should not be a task assigned to
monetary policy. An easy-money policy will
undermine price stability in EMU. EU coun-
tries need to have wage policies and a possibly
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harmonized employment policy as policy tools,
based on their different unemployment rates,
labour market conditions and national ap-
proaches.5
5) MAIN FEATURES OF THE HUNGARIAN
LABOUR MARKET
The labour market is an area of the Hungarian
economy that has undergone radical changes
during the transition period. Unemployment
rose in the early 1990s from virtually zero in
1989 to double digits, i.e. to levels prevalent in
the EU countries. The employment structure
has also changed profoundly, in occupational
and geographical terms.
Interestingly, Okun’s Law seems to have
applied in a limited way. Large, one-off
changes in labour participation wreaked havoc
with the figures, but more so with the link
between output and employment than between
output and unemployment. Quite substantial
                                                
5 The employment chapter added to the EU Treaty at the
Amsterdam summit can be interpreted in this way.
declines in unemployment have occurred since
1997.
Under central planning, there were high
rates of male and female labour participation.
The transition to market economy brought
radical changes in perceptions of the benefits
and costs of being active and of job opportuni-
ties. These led to a dramatic decline in labour
participation rates in the years following the
economic transformation. However, Hungary’s
participation rate has remained above the av-
erage for OECD economies at similar levels of
development, but more comparable with those
of EU countries. Male participation has sunk
below the EU level, while female participation
remains considerably higher. Employment
rates in Hungary are roughly comparable with
those of OECD and EU countries (To a large
extent, high unemployment rates can be at-
tributed to above-average labour participa-
tion.)
The unprecedented rearrangement of
economic activity during the transformation
not only put labour out of work and abolished
workplaces, but also reallocated resources to
other uses. Only a modest reduction in indus-
Table 7
Sectoral structure of employment, %
1992 1993 1994 1999 2000 2001 July 2002
Agriculture, forestry 11.27 9.13 8.73 7.09 6.54 6.20 6.19
Mining 1.29 1.10 1.04 0.64 0.50 0.34 0.39
Manufacturing 25.80 24.50 23.69 24.37 24.20 24.76 24.79
Electricity, gas, water 2.65 2.75 2.89 2.36 2.08 2.06 1.86
Construction 5.31 5.41 5.36 6.64 6.96 7.07 6.97
Industry 35.05 33.76 32.98 34.00 33.73 34.23 34.00
Wholesale, retail trade 11.77 12.27 12.46 13.58 14.05 14.21 14.33
Hotels, restaurant 2.83 2.88 2.95 3.49 3.46 3.71 3.55
Transport, telecom 8.48 8.79 8.38 8.09 8.10 8.06 8.12
Financial intermediation 1.68 1.90 1.94 2.12 2.17 2.04 1.98
Real estate, renting 3.44 3.60 3.35 4.82 32 0.69 5.93
Public administration, defence,
social security 7.19 7.83 8.54 7.92 7.77 0.50 7.57
Education 7.64 8.96 9.03 8.05 8.26 8.03 8.08
Health, social work 5.79 6.31 6.37 6.28 6.28 6.09 6.09
Other community, social and
personal service 4.75 4.54 5.26 4.54 4.32 4.25 4.17
Services 53.57 57.07 58.27 58.90 59.73 59.57 59.81
99.89 99.96 99.98 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Total number of employed 4082.70 3827.30 3751.50 3811.50 3849.10 3859.50 3858.90
Source: CSO.
13
trial employment was observable in Hungary,
because the service sector was already impor-
tant. However, there was a marked shift away
from agriculture.
Regional-mismatch unemployment is
interpreted as reflecting a big deficit in labour
mobility and travel-related infrastructure
(roads, highways, trains, buses, etc.), as well as
the nature of social insurance and family net-
works. The effective commuting radius of
Hungarian workers is severely limited by in-
frastructural considerations.
The transition to a market economy in-
cludes aspirations to avoid substantial inequal-
ity by means of state-managed social welfare.
Political demands for social insurance were
enhanced by the mounting strains on indi-
viduals during the course of the transition.
Unemployment compensation (e.g. early re-
tirement, benefits and severance payments)
were introduced in the early phase of transi-
tion, before the full force of the transformation
was felt and without much consideration for
potential costs. One of the big challenges was
to develop alternative systems of social insur-
ance to cover basic needs. At the same time,
the aim was to ensure that labour mobility was
not impeded, which was a central element of
transition to market economy.
The transition to a market economy ne-
cessitated redeploying the labour force, with
associated losses of human capital and reduc-
tions in expected lifetime income. Historical
experience has shown that most attempts to
protect a displaced labour force are made at
the expense of postponing needful structural
adjustment. The mobility deriving from struc-
tural adjustment is not restricted to moving
labour resources from overmanned manufac-
turing to underdeveloped services. Mobility is
also needed within industry – labour has to be
relocated from shrinking and failing firms to
new and growing ones, often in the same in-
dustry. An elaborate welfare net can reduce
the cost of failing to act and make a wait-and-
see policy more attractive, thereby raising the
implicit costs of mobility.
The development of total employment
in Hungary has changed significantly. The
transformation shock increased unemployment
in the first half of the 1990s, but between
1995 and 2000, there was an employment in-
crease of about 5 per cent. The alteration
seems to be accountable largely in terms of
corresponding differences in economic activ-
ity. However, statistics shows that employment
followed increases in output only weakly and
falteringly. Overall growth was driven mainly
by improvements in productivity levels rather
than increases of labour inputs.
The productivity increase of the 1990s
exceeded the rate sustainable in the long term
and tended to reflect rapid, massive initial re-
structuring of the economy. In a sense, this
significant increase came about more through
slow employment creation due to labour-
market rigidities. Comparing the period 1990–
97 with 1997–2001, there was a pronounced
slowdown in the rate of productivity increase.
This at first sight could be evidence against the
presence of Schumpeterian creative destruc-
tion, which would bring a gradually rising rate
of increase in labour productivity over the pe-
riod. However, the slowing of the improve-
ment is consistent with the presence of rigidi-
ties on the Hungarian la-
bour market.
6) POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES OF EU
ACCESSION AND EMU
FOR HUNGARY’S
Table 8
Economic activity of the Hungarian population –
unemployment rate, participation rate, %
Male Female Total
Unemploy-
ment
Partici-
pation
Unemploy-
ment
Partici-
pation
Unemploy-
ment
Partici-
pation
1992 10.7 66.7 8.7 51.1 9.8 58.6
1993 13.2 64.3 10.4 54.5 11.9 56.1
1994 11.8 62.4 9.4 46.3 10.7 54.1
1995 11.3 61.7 8.7 43.8 10.2 52.4
1996 10.7 61.1 8.8 43.4 9.9 51.8
1997 9.5 60.4 7.8 42.8 8.7 51.2
1998 8.5 60.1 7.1 44.1 7.8 51.7
1999 7.5 61.4 6.3 45.4 7.1 53.1
2000 7.1 61.9 5.6 45.8 6.4 53.5
2001 6.3 61.7 5.1 45.6 5.7 53.3
July 2002 6.1 61.6 5.1 45.8 5.6 53.4
Source: CSO.
14
LABOUR MARKET
The OCA theory lists several criteria for
economies to fulfil before they can integrate
their monetary systems without suffering em-
ployment losses and labour-market problems.
Hungary’s economy has visibly converged on
those of the EU countries. Its structure has
approached closely to the EU average. The EU
is by far its most important trading partner,
and the business cycles have become very
similar. Nevertheless, the appearance of
asymmetric shocks cannot be excluded.
Despite the similarities that have developed in
the last decade, potential adverse effects of EU
accession and EMU could bring about serious
economic difficulties. Participation in EMU
calls for an economy able to adjust either
through market forces or adequate economic
policy. Exchange-rate policy ceases to be
available as an economic-policy tool, being
replaced by flexible price and wage adjustment
or labour migration. Fiscal policy remains as a
way of smoothing the fluctuations in the
business cycle.
The following special features of the
Hungarian economy and economic policy can
be detected in terms of the OCA criteria:
(a) Asymmetric shocks occur more on a re-
gional than a national level.
(b) There is rather limited empirical evidence
of price flexibility. Some findings suggest
that it is probably high by international
standards, but this cannot really be proved
because the market economy only has a
decade’s history, in which relatively high
inflation rates will have distorted meas-
urements of flexibility.
(c) Wage and labour-market flexibility is
rated by the OECD as fairly flexible by
European standards.6 Pay negotiations at
national level include representatives of
three social partners (government, em-
ployees and employers), who agree upon a
suggested annual average pay increase in
                                                
6 Nioletti, G., et al. (2000).
the private sector and some general as-
pects of labour-market policy. The effec-
tive decisions are then taken at company
level by management and employee rep-
resentatives, who may take into account
productivity developments in the firm.
This system contains no element that
might hinder wage flexibility during or
after EU or EMU accession. The unem-
ployment elasticity of real wages in Hun-
gary has undergone changes in the last
decade. Pay in the early 1990s declined in
the regions more exposed to the shocks of
the transformation process. Within a few
years, the unemployment elasticity of
wages grew from – 0.015 to – 0.1, which
is a level common in market economies.
Some years later, during the course of sta-
bilization and completion of transforma-
tion, these regions lost much of the ad-
vantage they derived from lower labour
costs, as the productivity advantages of re-
gions with lower unemployment rates
gradually increased. The unemployment
elasticity of wages has decreased since
1996 and the causality between wages
and unemployment has weakened.
(d) Contrary to some views, labour migration,
as a form of adjustment to asymmetric
shocks within a monetary union, should
be on a comparable scale among countries
within the EU or EMU and among regions
within any country. Migration has par-
ticular importance because nominal wages
are supposed to be sticky downwards and
unable to adjust when an adverse or
negative demand shock occurs. This may
lead to an increase in unemployment.
However, migration can be a substitute for
higher unemployment. Some analyses
question the link between migration and
monetary union, arguing that migration
cannot bring adjustment to shocks, which
can only be handled by monetary policy.
Monetary policy can smooth, above all,
temporary demand shocks. Moreover, mi-
gration is inflexible because it is unlikely
that reversed migration will take place as
soon as a temporary negative demand
shock is over. In the longer term, a short-
age of skilled labour may come to hinder
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the development of the region from which
the migration takes place. This means that
price and pay flexibility should be the
main means of adjustment. Of course, mi-
gration may be necessary as an adjustment
to permanent shock effects, in which case,
it will take place as an adjustment mecha-
nism both in a monetary union and in a
country with an autonomous monetary
policy. The extent of migration depends
much on factors such as structural policy,
education and retraining, language
knowledge and real estate-market mobil-
ity.
Analyses of current and future cross-
border and domestic migration by the Hun-
garian labour force give a mixed picture, but
the labour force turns out to be rather immo-
bile.
(a) EU accession implies additional structural
shocks to the whole economy, particularly
agriculture and certain industrial and
service industries, which have already
been subjected to transformation shocks.
The accession could also bring higher un-
employment, because adjustment will be
much slower to the new steady state. Sev-
eral analysts emphasise that without a fast
catching-up process in the next couple of
decades, a possible detour would be an
outward flow of labour, particularly to the
EU. This would be a possible constraint on
real catching up, as it would result in a net
transfer of human capital to more devel-
oped EU regions. The more sustained this
process is, the more serious problems will
be. Various arguments for and against the
potential migration can be mentioned. The
experience of catching-up countries in
previous rounds of enlargement points to
relatively small migration effects being in-
duced by accession. However, economic
situations, such as wage differentials and
geographical proximity to important EU
labour markets, may not be fully compa-
rable. In the last decade, net migration
from Hungary to the EU has been rela-
tively moderate and Hungarian survey
data based on interviews do not suggest
that a big increase or a radical alteration
in the trend will ensue. A study by Bauer
and Zimmermann (1999) assessing vari-
ous prospects and labour-market implica-
tions of EU migration after enlargement
suggested that the economic and demo-
graphic situation in the EU and the appli-
cant countries would make further migra-
tion unavoidable. Most migration pressure
is expected to be on Germany and Austria.
According to their calculations, 2–3 per
cent of the acceding countries’ population
(about 3 million people) is expected to mi-
grate to the West within the next 10–15
years. This means an East-West flow of
about 200,000 people a year, which if
distributed evenly, would mean a flow out
of Hungary of about 20,000 people a
year.7 This scale of migration cannot be
considered an adequate adjustment
mechanism in the case of an asymmetric
shock.
(b) Migration inflows may be another matter,
as immigration of ethnic Hungarians from
neighbouring countries has been increas-
ing, and in some years, reached substantial
numbers. The trend may continue after EU
accession.
(c) Domestic migration has not been insignifi-
cant: 3.5–4.6 per cent of the population
moved regions in the 1990–95 period. But
this did not reduce the regional unem-
ployment differences. According to statis-
tical calculations, if this rate of migration
is sustained for 20 years, a 20 per cent
difference in unemployment rates will fall
to 13–15 per cent. The differences in re-
gional unemployment rates, pay and in-
come levels have been substantial and sta-
ble in Hungary in the last decade. Among
the main reasons has been the skill struc-
ture of the labour force and immobility on
the real-estate market. The differences
could not be reduced by commuting be-
cause of the transport infrastructure and
the high cost of travel.
                                                
7 The population of the 12 acceding countries is about
106 million and that of Hungary about 10 million.
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Table 9
Regional differences in the Hungarian labour mar-
ket – unemployment, income, migration
Differences in
regional un-
employment
rates (percent-
age points)
Differences in
gross monthly
regional in-
comes (%)
Regional mi-
gration among
15–59 age
group (% of
total popula-
tion)
1989
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
6.7
7.1
7.3
9.1
8.2
7.9
6.6
7.1
5.9
21.1
38.9
35.8
38.2
39.7
41.1
41.9
48.5
48.4
55.8
2.2
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.4
2.6
Source: Csajbók and Csermely (2002).
The Hungarian labour market is marked
by relatively low employment (56 per cent in
2000) and participation rates by comparison
with the EU average (63.1 per cent in 2000),
which in turn is relatively low internationally.
The EU aims to increase its employment rate to
67 per cent by 2005. The low Hungarian rates
arose from the structural changes of the
transformation process, the regional disparities
between created and lost jobs, and regional
skill-structure problems.
The structural differences of labour-
market supply and demand are likely to re-
main on the Hungarian labour market for
quite a long time. Labour markets usually react
to negative demand shocks by reducing the
participation rate and increasing the share of
the inactive population. Due to the structural
problems in the Hungarian labour force, much
of the inactive population cannot be consid-
ered as potential labour in periods of economic
prosperity or in the medium term. All these
features will have effects on the tools of ad-
justment policy to cope with shocks after Hun-
gary’s accession to the EU and EMU.
* * * * *
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